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LEGAL FEES INCURRED IN LITIGATION INVOLVING
TITLE TO ASSETS-ALLOCATION BETWEEN
DEDUCTIBLE ORDINARY EXPENSES AND NON-
DEDUCTIBLE CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
The differentiation between deductible and nondeductible
expenses under sections 162 and 212 of the Internal Revenue Code I
has been a constant and prolific source of controversy.2 Perhaps
because of the nature of the interested parties, legal expenses con-
stitute a disproportionately large part of this recurring dispute.3
Unfortunately, the proper tax treatment of legal fees is very un-
clear.4  Much of the existing uncertainty stems from a myriad of
administrative and judicial interpretations that attempt to trace the
boundaries of permissible deductions. The taxpayer and his ad-
visor are burdened with reconciling a wealth of interpretive rulings,
regulations, and decisions. Congress periodically attempts to dispel
the confusion or confirm a particular result by incorporating, quali-
fying or rejecting the extra-legislative interpretations through
amendments to the Code. Congressional intervention usually suc-
ceeds only in triggering new rounds of litigation, however.
The history of section 212 r, illustrates this cycle.6 In Higgins
v. Commissioner,7 the Court construed very narrowly the concept
1 References are to the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) of 1954, as amended,
unless otherwise noted.
2 See 4A J. MERTENs, LAw Or FEDERAL NCOm TuxAION §§ 25.01, 25A.01
(1972 rev.).
3 The issue promises to remain of current interest to taxpayers as the trend of
ever-increasing resort to the courts for the settlement of controversies (and the
concomitant rise in overall legal expenditures) shows no signs of abatement. See
The Chilling Impact of Litigation, Bus. WExx, June 6, 1977, at 58 ("litigation has
become the nation's secular religion... a virtual epidemic of "hair-trigger suing' ");
Crisis in Courts-New Moves to Speed Up Justice, U.S. NEws & WoiRLD REP., July
18, 1977, at 66 ("the growing tendency of Americans to sue"); Hufstedler, In the
Name of Justice-The Unending Rush to the Courts, 43 VrrAL SPEEsCIMs or T=
DAY 572; 575 (1977) ("We have long had the litigating habit, but in recent years,
the habit has become an addiction.").
4 See Note, The Characterization of Legal Fees as Deductible Expenses or
Capital Expenditures-A Need for Clarification in the Law, 21 SYRA cuSE L. REV.
926 (1970). See generally 4A MaRTENs, supra note 2, at §§ 25.01, 25A.01;
McDonald, Deduction of Attorneys' Fees for Federal Income Tax Purposes, 103
U. PA. L. REv. 168 (1954); Note, The Deductibility of Attorneys' Fees, 74 HAzy.
L. Rv. 1409 (1961).
5 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, §23(a)(2), 56 Stat. 819 (now I.R.C. §212).
6 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, §23(a)(1), 53 Stat. 12 (now I.R.C. §162).
7 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
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of "carrying on a business" to exclude management of one's own
income producing property, thus denying to the individual deduc-
tions available to business taxpayers. Dissatisfied with this con-
struction, Congress added section 23 (a) (2) (current section 212) 8
to bring the individual into virtual parity with the business tax-
payer for this purpose:
[T]he effect of § 23(a)(2) was to provide for a class of non-
business deductions coextensive with the business deduc-
tions allowed by § 23(a)(1) [current section 162], except
for the fact that, since they were not incurred in connec-
tion with a business, the section made it necessary that
they be incurred for the production of income or in the
management or conservation of property held for the pro-
duction of income.9
The practical consequence of this parity has been a greatly
enlarged opportunity for numerous investors to litigate the pro-
priety of expense deductions. The broad language of sections 162
and 212 provides little guidance for the treatment of expenses in an
endless variety of factual contexts. As Justice Cardozo noted: "The
Standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is rather a
way of life. Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the
riddle." 10 With regard to the deductibility of legal fees incurred
in a controversy involving title to assets, the Tax Court is quite
correct that "it would be idle to suggest that all the authorities in
this field can be reconciled." 11
When legal expenses relate to a controversy involving both
capital and ordinary income related elements, current tax tests
require a determination of the origin or primary purpose of the
underlying controversy and characterize all the expenses as if they
stemmed from that single purpose or origin. The present tests,
however, are incompatible with the judicial precedents from which
they originally derived, and, consequently, have engendered much
administrative and judicial confusion. Most importantly, the
present tests produce results that do not conform to the federal tax
policies underlying the distinction between capital expenditures
8 Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 121, 56 Stat. 819.
9 Trust Under the Will of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 374 (1945).
See also H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1942).
10 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
21Hermann L. Ruoff, 30 T.C. 204 (1958), rev'd on other grounds, 277 F.2d
222 (3d Cir. 1960), quoted in Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 576
(1970).
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and ordinary expenses. This Comment suggests that experience
has provided a yet unrecognized workable solution to the riddle of
deductibility of legal expenses related to establishing title to assets,
and proposes an alternative approach: proportionate allocation of
expenses between capital benefits that accrue over an extended
period and ordinary benefits that accrue currently.
Section I sets forth the statutory and policy bases of the capital-
ordinary distinction. Section II presents the problem of the de-
ductibility of the defense expenses and then traces the judicial
approaches to distinguishing between ordinary expenses and capital
expenditures when title is not directly in issue. Section III explores
the shortcomings of the developed tests, and Section IV details the
proposed alternative of allocation.
I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME UNDERLYING THE CAPITAL-
ORDINARY DISTINCTION
Sections 162 and 212 broadly outline permissible expense
deductions. The former allows deduction of all ordinary and
necessary business expenses; 12 the latter permits a corresponding
deduction to individuals of all ordinary and necessary expenses
incurred for the production or collection of income, or for the
management, conservation, or maintenance of income producing
property.13 Although seemingly irrelevant to the distinction be-
tween the capital expenditure and the ordinary expense, section
262, which disallows deduction of personal, living, or family
expense,' 4 is also pertinent because of the genesis of the principal
test of deductibility.
The Supreme Court has suggested that the differentiation
between capital expenditures and ordinary expenses inheres in the
"ordinary" standard of sections 162 and 212:
The principal function of the term "ordinary" in § 162 (a)
is to clarify the distinction, often difficult, between those
expenses that are currently deductible and those that are
12 "(a) IN GENmiALa.-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business .... ." I.R.C. § 162(a).
13 "In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-
(1) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the
production of income." I.R.C. § 212.
14 "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall
be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses." I.R.C. § 262.
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in the nature of capital expenditures, which, if deductible
at all, must be amortized over the useful life of the assets.-5
This observation applies equally to the function of the term "ordi-
nary" in section 212. Because of the parallelism of sections 162 and
212, courts have repeatedly indicated that the two provisions "are
in pari materia with respect to the capital ordinary distinction." 10
Whether or not the capital-ordinary distinction is implicit in
sections 162 and 212, section 263 expressly disallows deduction of
capital expenditures. 17 Generally, this means that expenses other-
wise deductible under the Code may not be deducted if "'made
primarily for the acquisition, development, or improvement . . .
of an asset, interest, or income producing status . . .' when either
the asset acquired or the benefit derived will last beyond the close
of the taxable year." 's The tax benefit of these capital items is not
lost to the taxpayer. Rather, an accounting of these expenditures
is either spread over future periods as depreciation deductions 1'
or postponed until the asset is disposed of, in the case of nondepre-
ciable or not fully depreciated assets. 2 0 If the asset is not de-
preciable, the expenditure is credited by a corresponding increase
in the basis of the asset under section 1016.
The differentiation between deductible and nondeductible ex-
penses reflects two fundamental policies of matching. First, the
Code distinguishes between expenses by the type of endeavor with
respect to which they were incurred. As the Supreme Court stated
in Lykes v. United States,21 "the deductibility [of expenses] turns
wholly upon the nature of the activities to which they relate." 22
15 Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966).
16 Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 575 n.3 (1970). Accord, United
States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 45 (1963); Trust Under the Will of Bingham v.
Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 373 (1945); California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Corp.
v. United States, 311 F.2d 235, 244 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
17"(a) GENmAL RuLE.-No deduction shall be allowed for-
(1) Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or
betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate." I.R.C. § 263(a).
18 McDonald, supra note 4, at 172 n.51 (quoting 1 FEDERAL INcoME TAx
STATUTE 284, 285 § X166, Comment (Feb. 1954 draft)).
19 I.R.C. § 167.
2 0 "(a) GENEaAL Ru_..-Proper adjustment in respect of the property shall in
all cases be made-
(1) for expenditures, receipts, losses, or other items, properly chargeable to
capital account." I.R.C. § 1016(a). Although personal expenses are nondeductible
under § 262, see note 14 & accompanying text, items incurred relative to capital
assets held in one's personal capacity, e.g. home improvement expenditures, may
increase the basis of those assets under § 1016.
21343 U.S. 118 (1952).
22Id. 123 (footnote omitted).
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Under this "categorical" matching, business and investment related
expenses are deductible (sections 162 and 212) but personal ex-
penses are not (section 262). Secondly, the Code uses "temporal"
matching-the capital-ordinary distinction-to distinguish deductible
expenses incurred for the benefit of the contemporaneous income
period from nondeductible expenditures incurred for the benefit of
future periods. This policy of temporal matching embodied in the
capital-ordinary distinction is also manifested in the Code's division
of time into twelve month periods 23 and "the pattern of the
revenue laws of accurately matching income and expenses within
annual accounting periods." 24 Generally, recognition of income
and related deductions of expense should take place in the year or
years in which the revenue or expenditure actually benefits the
taxpayer. Consequently, "an expenditure should be treated as a
non-deductible capital expense if it brings about the acquisition of
an asset having a useful life in excess of one year or if the expen-
diture secures a like advantage to the taxpayer which has a life of
more than one year." 25 From the concept of an enduring benefit
comes the generally accepted standard for identifying a capital
expenditure:
[A] majority of courts have coalesced around what may be
denominated an "accrual of benefits" test. That test de-
limits a standard which holds that a business expenditure
is of a capital nature when the benefits of the expenditure
are to be enjoyed over a comparatively lengthy period of
business operation, usually for a period of greater than the
taxable year in question.26
The mere existence of a capital element in a particular suit,
however, does not automatically determine the deductibility of
related expenses. "The rule that legal expenditures are non-de-
ductible when made in connection with certain 'capital' transactions
does not mean that, by a Pavlovian reflex, they must always be
non-deductible when 'capital' is involved, though the transaction
and occasion differ radically." 27 The lack of any ready touchstone
23 I.R.C. § 441.
2 4 Danskin, Inc. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1964).
25 Clark Oil & Ref. Corp. v. United States, 473 F.2d 1217, 1219-20 (7th Cir.
1973). Accord, United States v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298, 310
(1972); Medco Prod. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 F.2d 137, 138 (10th Cir. 1975);
Georator Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 283, 284 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 945 (1974).
26 Avery v. United States, 419 F. Supp. 105, 108 (N.D. Iowa 1976).
2 7 California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 235, 243
(Ct. c1. 1962).
[Vol. 126:1100
LEGAL FEES INCURRED IN LITIGATION
for reliable differentiation has rendered the capital-ordinary dis-
tinction particularly troublesome.
II. THE ADDED COMPLICATION OF DEFENSE OR PERFEcTION OF TITLE
A. The Theory
Although legal defense of title to a capital asset is clearly anal-
ogous to a capital expenditure, the language of section 212 arguably
classifies such legal fees as ordinary expenses incurred "for the . . .
conservation, or maintenance of property." The Supreme Court
has rejected the argument, stating that "in context 'conservation of
property' seems to refer to operations performed with respect to
the property itself, such as safeguarding or upkeep, rather than to
a taxpayer's retention of ownership in it." 28 Indeed, the Regula-
tions provide explicitly that "[e]xpenses paid or incurred in defend-
ig or perfecting title to property ... constitute a part of the cost
of the property and are not deductible." 29
This interpretation is consistent with the policy of temporal
matching that motivates the capital-ordinary distinction. Title
constitutes an asset having a life commensurate with the property
to which it attaches. Expenses for defense or perfection of title
generate benefits enduring beyond the taxable year in which they
are incurred and are therefore capital in nature.30 Hence, to the
extent that legal expenses are linked to a suit that can be charac-
terized simply as an action to defend or perfect title, they must
be capitalized. Conversely, legal fees incurred in a suit that con-
tains no element of title defense or perfection will be deductible
if the other requirements of sections 162 or 212 are met.
2SUnited States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 44 (1963) (footnote omitted).
2 9 Treas. Reg.' §1.212-1(k) (1957). See Treas. Reg. §1.263(a)-2 (1958)
(costs of defending or perfecting title similarly nondeductible under I.R.C. § 263).
See cases collected in 4A MERTENS, supra note 2, at § 25.24 n.43; id. § 25A.16 n.40.
30This characterization with respect to defense of title has been criticized
"because often the expense, though necessary, adds nothing to the value of the
property. The Code [§ 263] disallows only '. . any amount paid out . . . to
increase the value of any property or estate."' McDonald, supra note 4, at 189
(emphasis in original). Courts rarely distinguish title expenses that have failed to
increase the value of the underlying asset, probably because of the inherent diffi-
culty of such a determination. But see L. B. Reakirt, 29 B.T.A. 1296, 1297 (1934),
aff'd per curiam, 84 F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1936). "It is immaterial that this petitioner
was required to defend the title long after the property was first acquired, and at
a time when he reasonably might have expected to incur no additional title expense.'"
Jones' Estate v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 231, 232 (5th Cir. 1942).
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B. The Mixed Question
The capital-ordinary distinction is not so easily applied to
litigation expenses incurred in a suit in which defense of title is
not directly in issue or is not the sole issue. In Kornhauser v.
United States,81 the Supreme Court recognized that the fact that
title to property is in issue does not automatically render legal
expenses nondeductible. Just as potential effect on taxpayer's in-
come producing property cannot render otherwise nondeductible
expenses deductible,3 2 the mere presence of potential consequences
to taxpayer's title cannot render concomitant expenses nonde-
ductible:
In every case where income is derived from the land one
may find, lurking somewhere in the background, a ques-
tion of title to land. Entitlement to income derived
directly from the land is directly dependent upon title to
the land from which the income was derived. In that
broad general sense all income from real estate involves a
real estate title.
3
Denying deduction for the expenses of litigation in which title to
assets is only remotely involved, if at all, would render ineffective
the mandate of Congress in section 212.34 "It is, with gaze and
comprehension foreshortened by a too intense concentration upon
the shibboleth of a suit to obtain or defend title, to shut one's
eyes" 35 to reality. An intermediate position is required.
The inequity of an all or nothing approach is demonstrated
by the following hypothetical. A and B jointly developed a process
for extracting clean burning fuel from coal. At the time, no market
for such an energy source existed because the product was relatively
more expensive than petroleum fuels. Years later, B discovers that
A has patented the process in A's name alone and has granted
licenses for its use in return for substantial royalties. B approaches
A and reminds him of the genesis of the process and demands a
share of past and future royalties. A flatly refuses, claiming that
the patent belongs to him alone. B consults an attorney and files
suit, requesting a declaration of his interest in the patent and an
3.1276 U.S. 145 (1928).
32 Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118, 125 (1952). See text accompanying
notes 57-64 infra.
3 Usry v. Price, 325 F.2d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1963).
34 Sergievsky v. McNamara, 135 F. Supp. 233, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
35 Allen v. Selig, 200 F.2d 487, 489 (5th Cir. 1952).
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accounting for past revenue. B's suit is successful. The court
declares his ownership of a one-half interest in the patent and
orders A to account for revenues already collected. B collects
$75,000 in accrued royalties and his future interest in the patent
is appraised at $225,000. In litigating the issues and obtaining the
payment, B incurred $4000 in legal fees. What is the proper tax
treatment of this expense item?
A mechanical answer categorizing all the expenses as capital
or ordinary ignores the realities of the underlying transaction, and
is undeniably inequitable. B's suit had two purposes or origins:
to obtain declaration of his interest in the patent and to recover
past royalties. The two major judicial tests for classifying legal
expenses as capital or ordinary assume, however, that each suit has
only one true purpose 36 or origin.37 Thus, under current doctrine
a court might classify B's expenses entirely as nondeductible capital
expenditures, if it determines as a factual matter that perfection of
his title to an interest in the patent was B's primary purpose or
that the patent (a capital asset) lay at the origin of his claim. This
outcome is inequitable in that it penalizes B with nondeductibility
of his entire legal expenditure merely because his suit furthered
several purposes or derived from several origins. In remarks con-
cerning the primary purpose test, one court frankly admitted the
inferiority of the monolithic approach: "Divining the primary pur-
pose of the surveys here is beyond our competence. Nor do we
perceive that all human conduct must necessarily have one primary
or principal motivation. In fact the more 'principal' purposes a
venture has, the more desirable it may be." 38 Courts clearly lack
a principled basis for holding that one element of an action with
multiple origins or purposes so predominates all others that the
entire expense is attributable to it.
Most importantly, however, an all or nothing result does not
comport with the fundamental policy of temporal matching of
deduction and corresponding income. If all B's expenses are
are deemed capital, they will be applied entirely to increase his
basis in the patent for later depreciation or determination of gain
or loss on ultimate disposition. B, however, has received $75,000
in current income against which he will have no current deduc-
36 See, e.g., Rassenfoss v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 1946).
37 See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970);
Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970); United States v. Gilmore, 372
U.S. 39 (1963).
38R ust-Oleum Corp. v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 796, 801 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
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tion.39 To the extent that a portion of the expenses were attribut-
able to the collection of that income, he has been denied the benefit
of their deduction. Alternatively, if all of the expenses are con-
sidered ordinary, B will have the benefit of windfall deductions
to the extent any of the expenses were actually attributable to
perfection of title to his patent interest and should have been
spread over the life of the patent.
C. The Judicial Tests
Obviously some alternative analysis is necessary to alleviate
the shortcomings of the present tests. Consequently, closer exam-
ination of these tests is necessary to set the performance standards
for a substitute mechanism.
1. The Primary Purpose Test
The first test developed by the courts for distinguishing capital
from ordinary legal expenditures was the primary purpose test.
Under this standard, the primary purpose of the litigation controls
the deductibility of the accompanying expenses:
[I]f the primary or sole purpose of the suit is to protect
or defend title, the expenditures are not deductible ...
On the other hand, even though title may be involved, if
its defense or perfection is not the primary purpose of the
litigation, the expenditures do not encounter the barrier
of the regulation's standard and they may qualify instead.
as ordinary and necessary expenses.
40
Thus expenditures that would otherwise be considered capital
become deductible when combined with a stronger noncapital pur-
pose. "The primary purpose rule.., involves looking at a trans-
action and determining . . .whether the additional transactions,
although when viewed separately might in themselves look different,
are necessary concomitants to the primary or dominant aspect." 
41
The test was originally formulated in Rassenfoss v. Commis-
sioner,42 in which the taxpayer, a partner, had defended against
39 Of course, B would be forced to recognize all of the income currently with-
out the benefit of a deduction had he in fact incurred no related expenses. Further-
more, income averaging, I.R.C. §§ 1301-05, may be available to B.
40 Industrial Aggregate Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 639, 645 (8th Cir.
1960).
41Buder v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 425, 429 (E.D. Mo. 1963).
42 158 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1946).
[Vol. 126:110D
LEGAL FEES INCURRED IN LITIGATION
the partnership superintendant's demand that he be declared a
partner and that there be an accounting of partnership revenue and
assets. The court acknowledged that "the line of demarcation
between an 'ordinary and necessary expense' as a deductible item
and an expenditure incurred in defense of title to property and
therefore not deductible is extremely narrow." 43 Forced to decide
the issue on the facts before it, the court held: "[I]t is perfectly
plain, so we think, that the main and primary purpose of the suit
which petitioner defended was for an accounting and any question
of title was merely incidental thereto." 4 By its own admission,
the court in Rassenfoss was strongly influenced by the apparent
frivolity of the claim that resulted in the original complainant's
being granted a 1.75% limited partnership interest.45
The primary purpose test was amplified by Industrial Aggre-
gate Co. v. United States, 40 in which the taxpayer, engaged in the
business of removing sand, gravel, and other materials from leased
land, had been sued by his lessor for breach of the underlying leases.
The Eighth Circuit found that even though title had been involved,
the primary purpose of the lessor in the original litigation was to
recover damages and that the taxpayer's primary purpose was to
resist such liability.47  Hence, it held the taxpayer's legal expenses
to be entirely deductible. In its determination of the governing
purpose, the court looked to the pleadings, the evidence, the stipu-
lation for settlement, the opponent's purpose in instituting suit, the
taxpayer's purpose in defending, and each party's purpose in
settling.48
The primary purpose test has also been utilized to deny tax-
payers' deductions under similar fact situations.49 For example, in
48 Id. 766.
44 Id. 767.
45 Id. The court referred to the limited partnership interest as "almost an
infinitesimal... interest in the partnership." Id.
46284 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1960). See text accompanying note 41 supra.
47 284 F.2d at 647.
48 Id. In a similar case involving a declaration of partnership interest and an
accounting, the court in Marsh v. Squire, 48-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9142 (W.D. Wash.
1947), concluded that the suit brought by a former partner who had disappeared
twenty years before, was brought primarily for an accounting and receivership and
only incidentally for a decree vesting in him a specific interest in the property.
Therefore, all of the expenses incurred by the taxpayer in defending the suit were
held to be deductible.
49 Lewis v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1958); Addison v. Commis-
sioner, 177 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1949); Safety Tube Corp. v. Commissioner, 168
F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1948); Boulder Building Corp. v. United States, 125 F. Supp.
512 (W.D. Okla. 1954); Kasey v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1642 (1970), aff'd, 457
F.2d 369 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972).
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Kasey v. Commissioner,50 a suit for recovery of mining property and
for an accounting, the Tax Court held that "[p]etitioner's right to
receive an accounting or damages was wholly dependent upon and
incident to the resolution of the primary issue, viz, the determina-
tion of tide, and it is clear that the litigation concerned exclusively
this issue." 51 The expenses were therefore completely nondeduct-
ible. Similarly, in Safety Tube Corp. v. Commissioner,2 the Sixth
Circuit concluded that legal expenses involved in a suit for declara-
tion of title to a patent and for an accounting were fully non-
deductible:
The suit clearly involved the title to the Bradley patent
as a principal issue and the accounting for royalties as held
by the Tax Court was only a corollary to the determina-
tion of rights under the patent. The gist of the contro-
versy is the right to the asset which produced the income.
If the Bradley patent belonged to Seaton, then obviously
the petitioner was not entitled to royalties. . . . [T]he
litigation here struck at the very ownership of the patent
itself.5 3
The primary purpose test may be criticized in several respects.
First, as the cases described demonstrate, the standard yields "all
or nothing" results. All of the expenses incurred become either
deductible or nondeductible, depending on the court's determina-
tion of the taxpayer's primary purpose or intent.54 Second, the
primary purpose test necessarily involves courts in a difficult deter-
mination of the taxpayer's subjective intent.5 5 The use of the pur-
5054 T.C. 1642 (1970).
51 Id. 1649.
52168 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1948).
53 Id. 790.
54 Undeniably inequitable results follow when, for example, the taxpayer con-
ducts litigation with mixed motives. When a taxpayer recovers an asset that will
benefit him for a period greater than one year and items constituting current income,
his intent should be irrelevant. Rather, the policy of temporal matching of deduc-
tions with corresponding income points towards allocation of expenses between
capital and ordinary classifications as the theoretically sound outcome.
55 Difficult of reliable proof and potentially as varied as the individuals to
which it is ascribed, intent has been rejected or criticized in numerous contexts
when proposed as an appropriate standard. See Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose
in Federal Income Taxation, 34 U. Cu. L. REv. 485 (1967). The Supreme Court
has ruled out use of the primary purpose test for determination of the deductibility
of legal expenses incurred in the "process of acquisition" of assets, stating: "A test
based upon the taxpayer's 'purpose' in undertaking or defending a particular piece
of litigation would encourage resort to formalisms and artificial distinctions."
Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 577 (1970). See text accompanying
notes 83-84 supra.
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pose standard often leads to capricious results where one taxpayer
may deduct all his expenses while another must capitalize all his
expenses even though the underlying disputes are analogous.5 6 As
a corollary, the intent standard undermines the element of certainty
so necessary to the revenue laws.
2. The Origin of the Claim Test
This more recently developed standard requires an objective
determination of the origin of the claim with respect to which the
expenses were incurred rather than the determination of the sub-
jective intent or purpose of the taxpayer in instituting or defending
suit. The rule itself, however, was intended to distinguish between
the origin of a particular legal action and the consequences which
that same action may have on the business or income producing
assets of the taxpayer. Previously, taxpayers had attempted to
escape disallowance of personal expense deductions by arguing that
the predecessors of sections 162 and 212 allowed deduction of legal
expenses incurred to avert potential consequences to business and
income producing property. The argument with respect to income
producing property reached the Supreme Court first.
In Lykes v. United States,57 the Court held legal expenses non-
deductible if incurred in contesting liability for gift tax.58 To
counter the argument that expenses related to the essentially per-
sonal activity of gift-giving were nondeductible, the taxpayer in that
case contended that to pay the tax originally assessed he would
have been forced to liquidate stock thereby cutting off his major
source of income. Therefore, he argued, his legal expenses were
deductible under section 212's predecessor because they were in-
curred to conserve income producing property.5 9 Noting that the
"deductibility [of legal expenses] turns wholly upon the nature of
the activities to which they relate," 60 the Court rejected the tax-
payer's argument:
56 Compare Sergievsky v. McNamara, 135 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) and
Allen v. Selig, 200 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1952) with Lewis v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d
821 (2d Cir. 1958) and Garrett v. Crenshaw, 196 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1952). See
also text accompanying notes 46-53 supra.
57343 U.S. 118 (1952).
fs Congress has overturned this result in the 1954 Code. I.R.C. § 212(3).
s9 Alternatively, the taxpayer argued that the distributions of stock to his chil-
dren were not subsumed within the personal activity of gift-giving because they
were, rather, "part of a general plan to produce income for himself," being in the
nature of distributions pursuant to a stock-incentive plan for key employees of the
closely-held business of which taxpayer was a major shareholder. This characteriza-
tion was rejected as lacking factual support. 343 U.S. at 123-24.
60 Id. 123.
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Legal expenses do not become deductible merely because
they are paid for services which relieve a taxpayer of lia-
bility. That argument would carry us too far. It would
mean that the expense of defending almost any claim
would be deductible by a taxpayer on the ground that such
defense was made to help him keep clear of liens whatever
income-producing property he might have.
If, as suggested, the relative size of each claim, in pro-
portion to the income-producing resources of a defendant,
were to be a touchstone of the deductibility of the expense
of resisting the claim, substantial uncertainty and inequity
would inhere in the rule.... It is not a ground for...
[deduction] that the claim, if justified, will consume in-
come-producing property of the defendant.61
The rationale underlying Lykes is clear: the deductibility of ex-
penses should not rest on the potential effect a judgment will have
on the income producing property or business assets of a taxpayer.
The phrase "origin of the claim," which does not appear in the
Lykes opinion, has come to be associated with United States v.
Gilmore.32 In that case the Court held that legal fees incurred to
avoid potential consequences to business (as contrasted from invest-
ment, the issue presented in Lykes) do not qualify for deduction
under section 162's predecessor, if the origin of the expenses is a
personal transaction. The taxpayer, Gilmore, had incurred sub-
stantial legal fees in defending a divorce action.63 The taxpayer
claimed deduction of his legal expenses attributable to the successful
resistance of his former wife's community property claims, which,
had she prevailed, would have severely impaired his ability to earn
his living.6 The Supreme Court accepted the Court of Claims
determination that the taxpayer's "overriding concern" was to
protect his business related assets,6 5 but determined that all his
expenses were nondeductible personal expenditures:
61 Id. 125-26.
62372 U.S. 39 (1963). The phrase did appear in prior Supreme Court
opinions. See, e.g., Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1943);
Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
6 Gilmore v. Gilmore, 45 Cal. 2d 142, 287 P.2d 769 (1955).
64 The assets consisted primarily of controlling interests in three General Motors
automobile dealerships from which he received virtually his entire income. United
States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 41 (1963).
65 Id.
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The principle we derive from these cases is that the
characterization, as "business" or "personal," of the litiga-
tion costs of resisting a claim depends on whether or not
the claim arises in connection with the taxpayer's profit-
seeking activities. It does not depend on the consequences
that might result to a taxpayer's income-producing prop-
erty from a failure to defeat the claim, for, as Lykes
teaches, that "would carry us too far" ....
. . . [T]he origin and character of the claim with
respect to which an expense was incurred, rather than its
potential consequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer,
is the controlling basic test .... 66
Under the facts of the case, the Supreme Court held the expenses
entirely nondeductible because "the wife's claims stemmed entirely
from the marital relationship, and not, under any tenable view of
things, from income-producing activity." 67
The concerns that motivated the Lykes and Gilmore decisions
were twofold: (1) taxpayers should not be permitted to bring their
expenses within sections 162 and 212 artificially and without suffi-
ciently close relation to the profit-seeking bases of those provisions,
and (2) differential treatment should not be accorded taxpayers
based on the makeup of their assets. A system would hardly be
rational that granted a deduction to the taxpayer whose legal
expenses in personal injury litigation were to be satisfied out of
stockholdings while denying a deduction to the taxpayer who was
661d. 48-49 (footnotes omitted).
67 Id. 51. In Gilmore's companion case, United States v. Patrick, 372 U.S. 53
(1963), the Court similarly held that "the claims asserted by the wife in the divorce
action arose from respondents marital relationship with her and were thus the
product of respondents personal or family life, not profit-seeling activity." Id. 56.
The taxpayer had based his deduction on the theory that the fees were incurred in
order to arrange the property settlement so that his income producing property
would not be affected.
Having decided the categorical matching issue, the Gilmore Court left open
the temporal matching issue of whether the legal expenses, although not currently
deductible because personal, were, nonetheless, capitalizable into the basis of
Gilmore's stock:
In view of this conclusion [that the expenses are personal] it is unnee>
essary to consider the further question suggested by the Government:
whether that portion of respondents payments attributable to litigating the
issue of the existence of community property was a capital expenditure or
a personal expense. In neither event would these payments be deductible
from gross income.
372 U.S. at 52. See also note 20 supra & accompanying text. Indeed, a subsequent
district court decision held capitalization of the expenses into the stock basis to be
proper. Gilmore v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
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forced to sell his home in order to satisfy the judgment against
him. "We should be slow to attribute to Congress a purpose
producing such unequal treatment among taxpayers, resting on no
rational foundation." 68
Seven years after Gilmore, the Supreme Court in two com-
panion cases, Woodward v. Commissioner 69 and United States v.
Hilton Hotels Corp.,70 applied the origin of the claim test, not, as in
Lykes and Gilmore, to decide the categorical matching issue, but
rather to determine the temporal matching issue of distinguishing
capital from current expenses. In Woodward, the principal case,
the taxpayers, majority shareholders of an Iowa corporation, voted
for perpetual extension of the corporate existence. Under Iowa
law, they were forced to purchase the stock of the dissenting minor-
ity shareholder at its real value31 When the parties failed to agree
upon an appropriate price, the taxpayers brought an appraisal
action that ended in a determination of the selling price by the Iowa
Supreme Court.7 2 The taxpayers incurred extensive legal, ap-
praisal, and accounting fees for which they claimed deductions as
ordinary and necessary expenses under section 212. The single
question involved was whether these expenses were non-deductible
as capital expenditures incurred in the process of acquiring the
stock, without regard to the business-personal distinction of Gilmore
and without the added complication of title defense or perfection.
The taxpayers attempted to import the primary purpose test
from the defense or perfection of title cases, but the Supreme Court
rebuffed the effort:
[T]he "primary purpose" test has no application here.
That uncertain and difficult test may be the best that can
be devised to determine the tax treatment of costs incurred
in litigation that may affect a taxpayer's title to property
more or less indirectly, and that thus calls for a judgment
whether the taxpayer can fairly be said to be "defending
or perfecting title." Such uncertainty is not called for in
applying the regulation that makes the "cost of acquisi-
tion" of a capital asset a capital expense . . . [which] in-
68 372 U.S. at 48. The example is one suggested by the Court in Gilmore. Id.
69397 U.S. 572 (1970).
70397 U.S. 580 (1970).
71 IowA CODE ANN. § 491.25 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
72 Woodward v. Quigley, 257 Iowa 1077, 133 N.W.2d 38, modified on rehearing,
257 Iowa 1104, 136 N.W.2c1 280 (1965).
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volves the simpler inquiry whether the origin of the claim
litigated is in the process of acquisition itself.
78
Applying this theory to the Woodward facts, the Court held the
expenses to be nondeductible capital expenditures because "[w]here
property is acquired by purchase, nothing is more clearly part of
the process of acquisition than the establishment of a purchase
price." 74
The slightly different factual setting of Woodward's companion
case, United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,75 raised essentially the
same legal issue only in this instance under section 162 rather than
section 212. Hilton Hotels Corporation, the taxpayer, which owned
almost ninety percent of the common stock of the Hotel Waldorf-
Astoria Corporation, decided to merge the two companies. The
holders of approximately six percent of the Waldorf stock objected
to the merger and demanded payment for their stock under the
applicable New York statute. Rejecting Hilton's cash offer, the
dissenters began appraisal proceedings in connection with which
Hilton incurred legal and other professional service fees. On the
strength of its decision in Woodward, the Supreme Court held the
expenses nondeductible because "expenses of litigation that arise
out of the acquisition of a capital asset are capital expenses." 76
The Court found it immaterial that by operation of New York law
title to the dissenters' stock passed to Waldorf as soon as they indi-
cated their dissent,77 because the determination of price is an inte-
gral part of the acquisition process.78 The Court rejected the
Seventh Circuit's use of the primary purpose test in order to deter-
mine the nature of expenses incurred in the acquisition of capital
assets. 79
Three aspects of the Woodward and Hilton Hotels holdings
should be emphasized. First, although the Court invoked Gilmore
as authority for applying the origin of the claim test,80 Gilmore, as
already noted, employed the test in determining the entirely distinct
categorical issue. Indeed, courts in the period between Gilmore
and Woodward had frequently recognized the limited nature of the
73 Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 577 (1970).
74 Id. 579 (footnote omitted).





s0 [A] standard based on the origin of the claim comports with this Court's
recent ruling in [Gilmore]." Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 578 (1970).
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origin inquiry and indicated that the Gilmore test was unsuited
to the capital-ordinary inquiry. The court in Vermont Bank &
Trust Co. v. United States 8 concluded: "The question is not, as
in Gilmore, whether the expenses were personal or business in
nature but instead whether the expenses must be capitalized. It is
the Court's conclusion that the Gilmore test has no application to
the latter question." 82
Second, the Court specifically limited its holdings in Woodward
and Hilton Hotels to cases where legal fees are expended incident
to the "process of acquisition." 83 The Court acknowledged the
continuing applicability of the primary purpose test for purposes
of distinguishing capital and ordinary expenses in defense or per-
fection of title cases: "[The primary purpose] test may be the best
that can be devised to determine the tax treatment of costs incurred
in litigation that may affect a taxpayer's title more or less indirectly,
and that thus calls for a judgment whether the taxpayer can fairly
be said to be 'defending or perfecting title."' "4
81296 F. Supp. 682 (D. Vt. 1969).
82 Id. 685. See also Beerman v. United States, 390 F. 2d 638 (6th Cir. 1968);
Powell v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 977 (D.S.D. 1969), rev'd sub nom. Helgerson
v. United States, 426 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1970); Mitchell v. United States, 408
F.2d 435 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
A district court opinion and subsequent court of appeals reversal provide an
instructive comparison of the disparate results of the two origins tests. In Powell
v. United States the taxpayers incurred legal expenses in suits arising from a com-
plicated transaction involving an option to acquire the taxpayers' stock in a life insur-
ance company (National). The state insurance commissioner took custody of the
stock, which taxpayers had placed in escrow as security pursuant to the option and
purchase agreement, in order to prevent the contemplated acquisition. Taxpayers
instituted a class action on behalf of National's stockholders against the prospective
purchaser to preserve the value of their stock. The government stipulated that none
of the legal expenses were incurred because of the negotiation for the option and
purchase agreement of the original sale. The lower court held the expenses de-
ductible under section 212.
The stock, the value of which the taxpayers attempted to conserve
through the discussed litigation, represented the controlling interest of
National. Certainly it cannot be argued that that litigation was not an
attempt to conserve property held for the production of income ...
Clearly the present case meets the [business origin] test as required by
Gilmore.
294 F. Supp. at 978. After the Woodward and Hilton Hotels decisions, the court
of appeals reversed the lower court: "We conclude from the record and the stipu-
lated facts that the attorneys' fees and expenses originated in the process of dis-
position of the controlling stock interest in National, and hence are not deductible
by appellees under § 212." Helgerson, 426 F.2d at 1297. The two decisions starkly
reflect the differences in the two origin tests, the district court holding the expenses
deductible because of their business origin and the court of appeals holding the
expenses nondeductible because of their sale origin.
83 The Court cited approvingly Treas. Reg. § 1.26 3(a)-2(a) (1958) ("'[Tlhe
cost of acquisition . . . of . . .property having a useful life substantially beyond
the taxable year is a capital expenditure."). 397 U.S. at 575-76.
84 Id. 577.
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Third, Woodward and Hilton Hotels involved extremely
simple issues and were ill-suited to the highest court's announce-
ment of a test that would be used by lower courts to resolve a
whole range of subsequent cases. The Supreme Court recognized
that Woodward was not a borderline case in which characterization
of the expenses as acquisition related might present difficulty.8
The court proceedings underlying both cases consisted of setting
the price at which stock would be purchased by the taxpayers.
Undeniably, the determination of the price is an essential ingredient"
in the acquisition of any asset: "Under whatever test might be
applied, such expenses would have clearly been 'part of the acquisi-
tion cost' of the stock." 86
Even under the "uncertain and difficult" primary purpose test,
neither taxpayer should have been able to establish the deductibility
of the expenses involved. As the appeals court found in Woodward,
in such a suit the only credible purpose, setting the price of the
stock, was "inextricably woven into the fabric" 87 of a capital trans-
action. Similarly in Hilton Hotels the Seventh Circuit explicitly
found that "the paramount purpose of the appraisal proceeding was
to determine the fair value of the dissenting stockholders' shares in
Waldorf." s8 Under any reasonable interpretation of the primary
purpose test, such a finding should have been fatal to the taxpayers'
deductibility claim. Actually, however, the Seventh Circuit was
able to divorce the setting of the price from the process of acquisi-
tion and held the expenses deductible because under the New York
statute tite to the dissenters' stock passed as soon as they indicated
their dissent.89
Further, in Woodward, the principal case, the taxpayers' actual
theory for deductibility under section 212 was extremely weak, thus
presenting the Court with no tenable opposing theory to consider.
The taxpayers claimed that their expenses were incurred for the
management, conservation, or maintenance of income producing
property. As the Eighth Circuit expressed it:
[P]etitioners suggest that [the property conserved] was
their cash; that is to say, the less money the petitioners had
to pay for the stock the more money they would conserve.
85 Id. 578-79.
so Id. 578.
87 Woodward v. Commissioner, 410 F.2d 313, 320 (8th Cir. 1969), aff'd, 397
U.S. 572 (1970).
88 Hilton Hotels Corp. v. United States, 410 F.2d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1969),
rev'd, 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
89Id.
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This contention is wholly without substance. Section 212
was not designed to allow tax deductions for the preserva-
tion of one's net worth.90
The taxpayers' argument was simply an extension of the claim
rejected in Lykes v. United States,91 that the potential consequences
of a particular action on income producing property control the
deductibility of the expenses so incurred regardless of the nature
of the underlying controversy. Finally, because of the factual
similarity with Woodward and the peculiar New York statutory
provision upon which the Seventh Circuit hinged its decision, the
Supreme Court was able to reverse the court of appeals in Hilton
Hotels without additional theoretical discussion of the correct test.
The Woodward and Hilton Hotels decisions reached correct
results on their facts, but were based on a hasty adoption of the
origin of the claim test, a test developed for the resolution of an
entirely separate issue. Given their factual simplicity they were
poorly chosen vehicles for the promulgation of the new test. The
Court may be criticized for its failure to recognize the latent dys-
function of the origin of the claim test in the capital-ordinary area.
In the context of the simple setting in which the test was adopted,
the lack of foresight is understandable; the ensuing uncritical ex-
tension by the lower federal courts of the origin test to the more
complex areas of the capital-ordinary distinction is not.
The origin test was quickly adopted by the lower courts to
classify expenditures as capital in the analogous area of disposition
of property.92 The courts also utilized the test to distinguish capital
expenditures from deductible expenses in a variety of litigation,
including trademark infringement, 93 condemnation proceedings, 94
corporate liquidation under section 337.95 appraisal proceedings
in merger acquisition,96 nuisance action against adjoining land-
90 410 F.2d at 318.
91343 U.S. 118 (1952).
9 2 Estate of Baier v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 1976) ("We
are satisfied that the 'origin of the claim test' applies to expenses incident to the
disposition of property, as well as to the acquisition of property."); Estate of
Meade v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 161 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882
(1974); Helgerson v. United States, 426 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1970); Munn v.
United States, 455 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
93 Medco Prod. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1975).
94 Madden v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 912 (1976).
95 See Of Course, Inc. v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1974).
96 Third Nat'l Bank v. United States, 427 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1970).
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owner,97 civil antitrust claim, 98 contract action to rescind purchase
order for stock,9 9 and stockholders' derivative suits based on mal-
feasance by management 100 and on fraud by a family member in a
close corporation. 01
The most significant extension of the origin of the claim test
for purposes of the present inquiry has been to the area of defense
or perfection of title. The applicability of the origin test to defense
of title cases was first intimated in dicta of the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in Anchor Coupling Co. v. United States. 0 2 Negotiations
for the sale of the taxpayer corporation were aborted by one of
the corporation's two major shareholders. The potential purchaser
filed suit alleging that the negotiations constituted a contract for
the sale of Anchor's assets and sought specific performance. A
settlement was reached in which Anchor paid $600,000, which it
deducted from its gross income under section 162. The court held
the expenses nondeductible because "[t]he origin and nature of the
claim by Borg-Warner, which was liquidated by Anchor's settlement
payment, directly concerns Anchor's capital assets." 303
Anchor had argued for deductibility on the ground that its
purpose in settling was to eliminate the stultifying impact of the
litigation on its business operations. The court, however, refused
to follow Rassenfoss v. Commissioner 0- and other cases applying
the primary purpose test, 05 because it understood that test to be
no longer applicable to the facts before it in light of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Woodward and Hilton Hotels. Although
defense or perfection of title was not involved in Anchor Coupling,
the Seventh Circuit purported to analyze the case as if it were:
"Anchor protected ownership to its assets by removing Borg-War-
ner's claim through the settlement payment of $600,000." 101 In
dicta it interpreted Woodward and Hilton Hotels as justifying
abandonment of the primary purpose test for the determination
97 Clark Oil & Ref. Corp. v. United States, 473 F.2d 1217, 1220 (7th Cir.
1973) ("The acquisition of this property was at the heart of the dispute.").
9SEstate of Meade v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 161 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 882 (1974).
99 Cf. Meyer v. Commissioner, 547 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1977), discussed at
note 126 infra.
10ONewark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 539 F.2d 929 (3d Cir.
1976).
101 Brown v. United States, 526 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1975).
102 427 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 908 (1971).
103 Id. 433.
104 158 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1946).
105 427 F.2d at 434.
106 Id. 433.
19781 1119
1120 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
of the deductibility of incidental expenses even where protection
of ownership (as contrasted from acquisition of property) is the
underlying transaction:
[T]he Court did not intimate the extent to which the"
primary purpose test, as applied to costs incurred in pro-
tecting ownership, has been rejected by the adoption of an
objective standard of deductibility in Gilmore and Wood-
ward. We are convinced that the considerations which
prompted the Court to announce such a test in these cases
also impel us to fashion a similar test for determining
whether the settlement payment in this case is a business
expense or a capital expenditure.
0 7
This interpretation is wholly unwarranted given the Supreme
Court's express limitation of its Woodward holding to acquisition
cases. 108 In any event, the gratuitous nature of the quoted portion
of Anchor Coupling is easily demonstrated. The court could have
denied the deduction for the expenses regardless of the test em-
ployed. The origin of the Borg-Warner claim, specific performance
of an alleged contract for sale, was as certainly "in the process of
acquisition" as the stock appraisals in Woodward and Hilton Hotels.
The primary purpose of the settlement was to rid the company of
a claim against the entirety of its assets, a capital concern, which
had resulted incidentally in stagnant sales and income. Failing to
establish the expenses' deductibility under either of these standards,
the company also failed to meet the fundamental test of a capital
expenditure: Anchor acquired a benefit that would last beyond the
taxable year. Under any test, therefore, the expenses were capital.
Furthermore, title, in the sense used in previous decisions, was
simply not in issue in Anchor Coupling. The substance of the suit
against Anchor was a contract, not an ownership claim, albeit a
contract claim for specific performance of an agreement to sell-to
transfer title to-the assets.' 09 The defense of title cases in which
the primary purpose test has traditionally been used have uniformly
involved expenses growing out of litigation of ownership-not con-
tract-issues. The court-simply overstepped the boundaries of good
judgment and erred in holding that the origin of the claim test had
superseded the primary purpose test in the title area. Such a
determination was unnecessary to its decision.
107 Id. 432-33.
108 See text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
10 9 In order to characterize the suit as sounding in property rather than con-
tract, the court invoked the "doctrine of equitable conversion." Id. 433.
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The Anchor Coupling dicta was cited and followed by the Tax
Court in Reed v. Commissioner,1 0 a case actually presenting a
defense of title issue. Taxpayer, as beneficiary of her mother's will,
filed suit against the mother's former partners in a food enterprise.
In the first cause of action, the taxpayer sought to have a construc-
tive trust, preliminary to a reconveyance, imposed on what had
been her deceased father's interest in the same partnership; tax-
payer's mother, while still alive, had had the option to purchase
this interest. Taxpayer alleged that the defendants (the other
partners) had acquired the father's interest through a breach of
fiduciary duty owed the mother. In the second cause of action,
taxpayer sought rescission of that part of the partnership agreement
that imposed restrictions on the free transferability of what had
been the mother's interest in the partnership. She alleged that
these restrictions had been obtained unfairly by preying on the
mother's incompetency. The court denied the taxpayer's claim to
deductions for legal expenses under sections 162 and 212 on the
basis of the origin of the claim test."' The first cause of action fits
neatly into the Woodward and Hilton Hotels "process of acquisi-
tion" category; thus application of the origin test to its expenses
was appropriate. The court characterized the second cause of
action, however, as having the elements of a suit to perfect or quiet
title, which, because of substantial restrictions on transferability,
was incomplete." 2  Applying the origin test on the strength of
Woodward as interpreted in the Anchor Coupling dicta, the court
held that the origin of the suit was "directly related to the capital
asset underlying the partnership agreement, hence the expenditures
were capital in nature." 113
Without quarreling with Reed's result, the uncritical accep-
tance of the Seventh Circuit's dicta is disturbing. The danger of
the Anchor Coupling test is that all title defense or perfection
related expenses will be deemed capital because any suit to defend
or perfect title will have a capital asset at its origin. Certainly
decision by "Pavlovian reflex" :14 or by "concentration on the shib-
boleth of a suit to perfect or defend title" 11 cannot have been the
11055 T.C. 32 (1970).
111 As the Tax Court observed, the same result of nondeductibility of the
expenses attendant to the second cause of action would have been reached under
the primary purpose test. Id. 41 n.12.
112 Id 41, 42.
113Id. 42.
14 California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 235, 243
(Ct Cl. 1962).
115 Allen v. Selig, 200 F.2d 487, 489 (5th Cir. 1952).
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intended result of Supreme Court adoption of the origin of the
claim test in Woodward and Hilton Hotels. Certainty of result
may have been achieved but at the expense of realistic examination
of the facts of a particular controversy.
III. THE MIXED QUESTION IN THE DUAL NATURE LITIGATION:
AN ExAMPLE OF THE DYSFUNCTION OF THE DEVELOPED TESTS
Consider the tax consequences to the hypothetical taxpayer B 116
when the two principal judicial tests are applied. A court applying
the primary purpose test would look to a host of indicia of the
taxpayer's subjective intent in litigating the suit," 7 and, according
to its determination of which purpose-to obtain an accounting of
past revenue or to obtain a declaration of entitlement to an interest
in the patent-was dominant, hold the legal expenses deductible or
nondeductible.
Application of the Gilmore origin of the claim test results in
the simple determination that the expenses here were not personal
but arose in a profit-seeking context. The source of the controversy
lay in B's trade or business as an inventor, not in any personal or
non-profit-seeking endeavor. Once the origin is determined to be
business related rather than personal, the Gilmore origin test ceases
to be useful. The Woodward origin test is arguably not relevant
to B's case. B did not incur these particular expenses in the
"process of acquisition" of a new patent interest. Rather, the legal
fees were paid out to establish his already existing rights in the
patent and to accumulated income, rights he had acquired in the
past through his efforts in the joint development of the patent with
A. Nevertheless, courts following Anchor Coupling and Reed
would now ask what was the "real" origin of B's litigation: the
recovery of past royalties (deductible expense) or the declaration of
a partnership interest in the patent (capital expenditure).
One may well ask how this differs from determining B's primary
purpose in instituting the suit. s8 The court or Service still will be
116 See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
11 7 See note 48 supra & accompanying text.
118 The language of Anchor Coupling Co. v. United States, 427 F.2d 429 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 908 (1971) and Reed v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.
32 (1970) demonstrates the similarity of the two tests. In Anchor Coupling, the
court held that "the origin and nature of the claim ... directly concerns Anchor's
capital assets." 427 F.2d at 433. In Reed, the Tax Court found that "the origin is
directly related to the capital asset underlying the partnership agreement." 55 T.C.
at 42. Such language bears a suspicious resemblance to the expressions of the courts
when using the primary purpose test. The courts again have the freedom to deter-
mine the primary, dominant, or direct origin despite the Supreme Court's efforts to
curb such subjectivism.
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involved in an inquiry of causality whether denominated "origin"
or "purpose." Although the latter may initially appear more sub-
jective because individual intent must be ascertained, the difference
is more semantic than real. In determining the Woodward-type
origin, the court must be influenced by whatever purpose the tax-
payer seems to have been furthering, in other words whether acqui-
sition of income or title was the predominant motivation. If a
court refuses to inquire into the taxpayer's intent and limits itself
to so-called objective facts to determine which element was the
more likely source of the litigation, the court may be left with such
questionable factors as relative monetary values of the two potential
elements of recovery, the current financial status of the taxpayer, the
comparative likelihood of prevailing on the merits of each claim, or
a descriptive determination of what most people would be seeking.
In this inquiry, however, each question appears aimed at a deter-
mination of what must have been the taxpayer's purpose, albeit
based on supposedly objective factors and without any inquiry into
individual motivation.
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States,119 a recent Third
Circuit case, illustrates these observations. The taxpayer-newspaper
had previously acquired a beneficial, controlling interest in the
stock of another newspaper. The Morning Ledger instituted a
derivative action as shareholder, alleging malfeasance by the man-
agement of the acquired newspaper. It later deducted its legal fees
as business expenses under section 162. The Third Circuit adopted
the Woodward origin test 120 and stated: "In announcing the 'origin
and nature' test, the Supreme Court limited the category of control-
ling facts to 'objective' rather than 'subjective' ones." 121 Con-
cluding that "[i]ntent or motive is irrelevant under the origin of
the claim test," 122 this court found that "[t]he origin of the litiga-
tion was to prevent destruction of assets rather than gain bene-
fits." 123 The difference between this and the determination that
the purpose of the litigation was to prevent destruction of assets
rather than gain benefits is negligible. Very little has been gained
by the replacement of the "subjective" primary purpose test by
the "objective" origin test, other than the sterile satisfaction of new
descriptive terms.
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The greatest danger of the Woodward origin test, however,
inheres in the ordinal connotation of the word "origin." Because
origin suggests source or first, 24 the court may be led to a but-for
determination that will deny the deduction in most instances. In
the hypothetical situation, the court could find that but for the
capital asset, the patent, that forms the basis of the controversy, no
royalties would exist.12 The origin test leads the court to that
type of decisionmaking because the inquiry seems to consist of
determining the element that preceded and formed the basis of
the controversy, thereby originating the suit. In a mixed title and
income suit, of course, the solution will be nondeductibility because
title must be established before right to the income from the asset
can be established. The determination of deductibility becomes
mechanical and very certain: because perfection of title *must pre-
cede right to income, the capital element will overpower the ordi-
nary element1
26
124 Origin is defined as "rise, beginning, or derivation from a source" and
"primary source or cause." WEBsTxa's THmo NEw IN'l DicrioNmny 1591
(unabr. 1966).
1
2 5 In Munn v. United States, 455 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1972), taxpayer, the
income beneficiary of a trust fund, incurred legal fees to force a reassessment of
extraordinary income payable to him after the trust sold various assets. The tax-
payer argued that his expenses were incurred for the production of income and
hence were deductible under section 212. Citing Woodward and Hilton Hotels,
the court, however, held the expenses nondeductible:
[H]ere there was the sale of a capital asset. This factor leads to our
opinion that for whatever reason plaintiff felt he was incurring the ex-
penses . . .they cannot be divorced from the sale of the capital assets.
It cannot be disputed that without the sale of stock there would have been
no reason to instigate the legal action for collection of the proceeds of
that sale.
Id. 1033. The court here employed the dangerous "but for" test that clearly proves
too much and that would eclipse the section 212 deduction because virtually all
income can. be related directly or indirectly to a capital asset. The court might as
easily have concluded that the origin of the taxpayer's litigation was the determina-
tion of the correct amount of income due him under the trust and thus ruled in
favor of the deductibility of the expenses. The result in Munn is most probably
correct, however, because the underlying transactions, the sale of stock and the
distribution of income resulted in capital gain to the recipient. See I.R.C. § 662(b)
(retention of tax character of items distributed to beneficiaries of trusts). Even
though capital gains constitute current income to the recipient, expenses directly
related to the sale of assets are treated as adjustments to the basis or sales price
rather than as deductible expenses. See Commissioner v. Doering, 335 F.2d 738,
741 (2d Cir. 1964). The methodology of the case-the "but for" analysis-must
be eschewed, however, for the section 212 deduction would virtually disappear.
126The Fifth Circuit recently borrowed the origin test from the §§ 162, 212
context to determine deductibility of legal fees as a loss under § 165(c) (2). Meyer
v. Commissioner, 547 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1977). In Meyer, taxpayers entered into
five different purchase orders through their broker for stock that was never delivered.
They instituted suit to rescind the order and to obtain return of their advances and
received in settlement some cash and stock. In ruling under § 165(c) (2) on the
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Such a mechanical solution is inherently inequitable and theo-
retically unsound. First, it is unlikely that B has one motive or
that the litigation has one origin so predominant that identification
of expenses with that single motive or origin reflects reality. In this
sense, both the primary purpose and the origin of the claim test
suffer from the same defect. More importantly, however, since both
tests yield all or nothing results they fail to accommodate the
theoretical basis of the capital-ordinary distinction: temporal match-
ing. The mechanical all or nothing rule might be supportable if
taxpayers and their advisors could thereby predict a reliable result.
Similarly, the tests might be justified because they promoted ease
in decisionmaking by the Service and the courts. Certainty, relia-
bility, and administrative feasibility might justifiably be traded for
a tolerable amount of inequity. The cases discussed abundantly
evidence, however, that neither certainty nor administrability has
been achieved under either test. Furthermore, no amount of cer-
tainty, would support the evisceration of sections 162 and 212 were
the but-for test universally adopted. The observer is forced to
conclude that (1) the tests unrealistically assume that expenditures
have single, clearly identifiable, dominant bases, (2) the results are
inconsistent with the policy of temporal matching that underlies
the capital-ordinary distinction, and (3) the positive attributes of
a mechanical rule that might justify the inequitable or incorrect
results have not been realized.
deductibility of the legal fees incurred, the court purportedly applied the Woodward
and Gilmore decisions and resulting origin of the claim test, id. 947, but actually
must have been employing a hybrid "original purpose" test. The court indicated
that the factual determination that taxpayers had entered the original stock trans-
action for profit rendered the later expenses deductible under the origin test. Id.
It rejected the Commissioner's argument that the suit was instituted to recover
property and hence that the expenditures were capital and nondeductible. The
court articulated the ground of its holding as follows: "The purpose of the expendi-
ture for legal fees was to rescind a contract for stock and to recover the purchase
price." Id. 948 (emphasis supplied).
This combination of purpose and origin demonstrates the difficulty courts con-
tinue to experience in determining the correct standard for decision in the mixed
issue suit. In Meyer, the outcome depended on the court's choice of origin-the
original profit-seeking transaction as argued by the taxpayer or the more proximate
suit to recover property as argued by the Commissioner. After defining the origin
so that the expenses were deductible, however, the court disallowed a portion of
the expenses and required capitalization to the extent that the recovery consisted of
stock. Id. Theoretically, the origin test accords no relevance to the consequences
of a particular suit and hence the court's reasoning-although leading to an attrac-
tive result-seems unsound.
In passing it may be noted that the court was understandably uncomfortable
with the Commissioner's argument in favor of capitalizing all the fees. Even if the
origin of the suit was to recover property, that property, cash, was not capital in
nature. See id. 947, 948. See also note 127 infra.
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IV. THE ALTERNATIVE: ALLOCATION BETWEEN THE
CAPITAL AND ORDINARY ELEMENTS
In litigation indirectly involving title or in which title is not
the sole issue, allocation of expenditures between the deductible-
ordinary and nondeductible-capital categories would promote equity
and the relevant policy of temporal matching as well. In the hypo-
thetical, B would be allowed to deduct against the current royalty
income the expenses properly allocable to its collection, whereas he
would be required to capitalize the portion attributable to the
declaration of his interest in the patent.127 Allocation permits a
court to adopt a common sense approach and recognize for all
purposes that the suit consists of a mixture of capital and ordinary
elements. Furthermore, it avoids the absurd differentiation that
heretofore existed between expenses of a single suit with two ele-
ments and the combined expenses of two suits on the same under-
lying subject matter but split by remedy or complaint. That would
occur, for example, if B filed suit first to perfect title to the patent
and thereafter to collect accrued royalties. In such a situation, the
courts have been more than willing to characterize the expenses of
the first suit as nondeductible capital expenditures and those of
the second as deductible expenses.128
12 7A would similarly deduct his expenses attributable to litigation of the
royalties and capitalize those attributable to the issue of title to the patent into the
basis of his one-half interest. A might prefer capital loss treatment in regard to
the latter expenses. See I.R.C. § 165(f). He would have to explain, however, how
he managed to "exchange" an interest in the patent which in the court's determina-
tion he never owned. A similar issue is presented as to what would be the proper
treatment of B's expenses if he lost both on the royalty and patent issues. Given
the business origin of the litigation, presumably B would argue that the expenses
are entirely deductible under § 162. The Service will wish to argue that at best
B is entitled to capital loss treatment, but then it will be faced with the task of
explaining the whereabouts of the capital asset upon the exchange of which the
loss was incurred. Cf. Meyer v. Commissioner, 547 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1977),
discussed at note 126 supra.
12 8 In Boagni v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 708 (1973), taxpayer incurred legal
expenses in two separate proceedings: (1) a declaratory judgment action in which
members of his family sought a determination that they owned twenty-nine percent
of an overriding royalty interest and (2) a concursus proceeding in which the oil
company sought directions for the disposition of the proceeds of the oil produced
from the property in issue, id. 710. The court characterized the original suit as
defense of title and the concursus proceeding as a suit for the collection of accumu-
lated royalties and allocated the legal expenses between the two. Id. 715. See also
Usry v. Price, 325 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1963) (First suit adjudicated title to oil
producing property, second dealt with royalties from same land but different wells.
Taxpayers successfully pleaded res judicata as to title and asserted unqualified right
to royalties. Legal expenses of second suit entirely deductible.). A rule of law
which differentiates on the basis of the form in which property and income are
recovered and yet fails to recognize the same distinctions when a single suit is
brought combining the two cannot be sound. Such a rule encourages resort to
multiple lawsuits and promotes ineficient use of judicial resources.
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LEGAL FEES INCURRED IN LITIGATION
The major problem presented by allocation is one of adminis-
trability. Because a court would be required to distinguish the
existence of the capital and ordinary elements in order to apply
either the primary purpose or origin test, the added complication
lies entirely in the process of allocating the expenses themselves.
This complication must be balanced against the dysfunction of the
inquiry under the purpose or origin tests: its failure to effectuate
the temporal matching policy central to the capital-ordinary distinc-
tion. Furthermore, the courts and the Internal Revenue Service do
have experience in allocating expenses in certain limited areas.
Under each of the tests and in differing situations, the courts have
sometimes been amenable to allocation of the expenses among the
identifiable categories. The courts generally have not stated why
allocation is appropriate in the particular instance, but from the
language of the various opinions it appears that allocation will be
allowed when two distinct and equally important purposes or origins
coexist.1 29 Allocation, however, should be the rule and not simply
an exception when more than one strong motive or true origin is
discovered. The expenses should be apportioned between deduct-
ible and nondeductible categories in any controversy in which
capital and ordinary elements are distinguishable (unless one is
clearly de minimus 130).
Courts have apportioned expenses between capital and ordinary
categories in cases which involve oil- or mineral-producing property
and royalties,' 3' patent infringement and royalties, 32 trademark
infringement and unfair competition, 3 3 stock and accumulated
129 See, e.g., Singer v. Commissioner, 34 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 337, 348 (1975)
("the attorney's fee was paid for a dual purpose"); Thomas E. Arnett, 31 T.C. 320,
335 (1958) ("Arnett had two purposes in instituting the litigation here in question:
(1) To quiet title and (2) to collect income; and that neither purpose was pre-
dominant."). See generally Rust-Oleum Corp. v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 796
(N.D. II. 1967).
130 See, e.g., Kozak v. Commissioner, 30 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 717 (1971).
13' Estate of Morgan v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1964); Brown
v. United States, 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19501 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Boagni v. Com-
missioner, 59 T.C. 708 (1973); Vest v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 128 (1971), reo'd
in part, aff'd in part on other grounds, 481 F.2d 2.38 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1092 (1973); Thomas E. Arnett, 31 T.C. 320 (1958); James Petroleum Corp.,
24 T.C. 509 (1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910
(1957). Cf. Usry v. Price, 325 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1963) (deductibility of fees in
second suit upheld when based on determination of title in previous suit). But see
Kasey v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1642 (1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972) (determination of title primary issue).
'
3 2 William A. Falls, 7 T.C. 66 (1946). But see Safety Tube Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 168 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1948) (right to asset gist of controversy).
133 Rust-Oleum Corp. v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. In. 1967).
This unique suit and differentiation should not be confused with those cases that
consistently hold that legal expenses incurred in a trademark infringement suit are
19781
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interest or dividends, 34 employment related stock repurchase agree-
ment and bonus, 3 5 derivative action against management to recover
illegally paid bonus and fraudulently conveyed stock,186 partnership
interest and an accounting, 37 divestiture action and defense of
antitrust litigation, 8 defense of title and preservation of value of
stock,8 9 employment related stock repurchase agreement and settle-
ment of negligence claim against employer, 40 and title to rent
producing property and rental income.14'
The last example is especially interesting because the Regula-
tions under section 212 explicitly provide for this type of allocation:
"Attorneys' fees paid in a suit to quiet title to lands are not deduct-
ible; but if the suit is also to collect accrued rents thereon, that
portion of such fees is deductible which is properly allocable to the
services rendered in collecting such rents." 142 Nothing inherent
in the nature of rental property and accrued rents, however, sug-
gests that the same allocation should not generally be accorded to
other dual element controversies. Indeed, the Regulation under
section 212 that treats the nondeductibility of capital expenditures
contains a cryptic parenthetical statement that could arguably be
construed as authority for allocation between capital and income
nondeductible capital expenditures. Danskin, Inc. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d'360,
361 (2d Cir. 1964) ("The financial gain which petitioner realized from these legaI
proceedings, through the enhancement of the value of its registered trademark, is
an increment of a sort which will endure for many years to come."). Accord,
Medco Prod. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1975); Georator Corp.
v. United States, 485 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945 (1974);
Buddy Schoellkopf Prod., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 640 (1975).
134 Spangler v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1963); Helvering v.
Stormfeltz, 142 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1944).
135 Joseph Frank, 22 T.C. 945 (1954), aff'd, 226 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1955).
136 Larchfield Corp. v. United States, 373 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1966). This case
raises the interesting point that although legal fees paid on its own behalf would be
nondeductible to the corporation, they do not have the same character when made
by a corporation pursuant to a contractual arrangement to indemnify an employee.
"Payment of legal fees under such a by-law has been reasonably characterized as a
'fringe benefit necessary to induce officers and directors to serve, deductible in any
event to the corporation as reasonable compensation."' Id. 167 (quoting McDonald,
supra note 4, at 191-92).
1387 Estate of Morgan v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1964); cf. Reed
v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 32 (1970) (taxpayer provided no basis upon which allo-
cation could be made). But see Rassenfoss v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 764 (7th
Cir. 1946) (accounting primary purpose).
138 E.L duPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir.
1970).
139 Singer v. Commissioner, 34 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 337 (1975).
140Eisler v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 634 (1973).
141 Daniel S.W. Kelly, 23 T.C. 682 (1955), aff'd, 228 F.2d 512 (7th Cir.
1956).
142 Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(k) (1957).
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elements generally: "Expenses paid or incurred in defending or
perfecting tide to property, [or] in recovering property (other than
investment property and amounts of income which, if and when
recovered, must be included in gross income) .. . constitute a part
of the cost of the property and are not deductible expenses." 143
One commentator has noted that this parenthetical "seems to have
passed completely without judicial interpretation." 144
The Supreme Court has indicated its approval of apportioning
expenses between business and personal categories'145 and courts
have allocated expenses between those categories in cases which
involved alleged malfeasance with respect to personal residence and
financial advising and fiduciary duties,14 6 relationship with brother
and partnership accounting,147 annulled marriage and dividend and
interest income,'45 and especially divorce and alimony.149  The
latter constitutes an important exception to Gilmore and its com-
panion United States v. Patrick 150 but "relates solely to expenses
incurred by the wife for the production or collection of amounts
'includible in gross income under section 71,' which deals with the
taxability of alimony and similar amounts received by a wife as
separate maintenance or support in connection with the marital
relationship." 'l The allocation between legal expenses of divorce,
nondeductible as personal expenses, and those related to the collec-
tion or production of includible alimony is expressly provided for
in the Regulations:
[T]he part of an attorney's fee and the part of the other
costs paid in connection with a divorce, legal separation,
written separation agreement, or a decree for support,
which are properly attributable to the production or col-
143Id. (emphasis supplied).
144 McDonald, supra note 4, at 186 n.179. He also concludes that the only
grammatical interpretation of the Regulation would also mean that expenses of
recovering investment property are deductible rather than additions to basis. Id.
Such a treatment, however, would be against the substantial weight of judicial
interpretation.
145 Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941).
14G Ditmars v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1962).
147 Buder v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Mo. 1963).
148 Kozak v. Commissioner, 30 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 717 (1971).
149 Howard v. Commissioner, 34 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 751 (1975); Mirsky v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 664 (1971); Porter v. Commissioner, 25 Tax Ct Mem. Dec.
448 (1966), af'd on other grounds, 388 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1968); Ruth K. Wild,
42 T.C. 706 (1964).
15o 372 U.S. 53 (1963).
151 Gerald G. Wolfson, 47 T.C. 290, 294 (1966).
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lection of amounts includible in gross income under
section 71 are deductible by the wife under section 212.152
In this instance the differing treatment for expenditures that result
in current income is drawn by reference to section 71 which re-
quires inclusion of alimony in income under certain circum-
stances. 153 Again it is difficult to understand why the divorce and
alimony dichotomy is any more conducive to allocation than any
other dual purpose or origin controversy.
The courts and Service have treated the deductibility of a
portion of legal expenses properly allocable to the recovery of
taxable as opposed to nontaxable income as a distinct area in which
apportionment of the expenses is unquestioned.' 54 The Regulations
under section 265 which disallows any otherwise available deduc-
tion if the expenditure relates to tax-exempt income 155 specifically
provide for allocation between the two categories:
Expenses and amounts otherwise allowable which are
directly allocable to any class or classes of exempt income
shall be allocated thereto; and expenses and amounts
directly allocable to any class or classes of nonexempt in-
come shall be allocated thereto. If an expense or amount
otherwise allowable is indirectly allocable to both a class of
nonexempt income and a class of exempt income, a reason-
able proportion thereof determined in the light of all the
facts and circumstances in each case shall be allocated to
each.
5 6
Similarly, the courts and Service allow deduction of legal expenses
properly allocable to tax advice when included with other expenses
that are nondeductible.15
7
' 52 Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1 (b)(7) (1958).
153 I.R.C. § 71.
'54 Mary Tighe, 33 T.C. 557 (1959); William H. Jamison, 8 T.C. 173 (1947);
Mary K. Ellis, 6 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 662 (1947); Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr., 2 T.C.
1128 (1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871 (1945). Cf.
Tucker v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1963) (similar allocation of trust
expenses between tax-exempt and taxable income under I.R.C. § 652).
155 I.R.C. § 265(2).
156Treas. Reg. § 1.265-1(c) (1958).
157 Suter v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (capital expendi-
tures, personal expense and tax advice expense); Munn v. United States, 455 F.2d
1028 (Ct Cl. 1972) (capital expenditure and tax advice expense); Merians v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 187 (1973) (estate planning expenditure and tax advice
expense). See also Rev. Rul. 545, 1972-2 C.B. 179 (divorce expenses and tax
advice expense).
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Allocation effectuates the matching policy permeating the ex-
pense deduction and disallowance provisions of the Code. A sub-
stantial number of judicial rulings and tax regulations support
such allocation in specific instances and demonstrate the capacity
of the judiciary and administrative bodies to undertake the appor-
tionment process. Three methods of allocation are possible.
The first procedure places the burden on the taxpayer's attorney
to record as accurately as possible the actual time spent on the
separable aspects of a particular controversy. 15s This procedure is
attractive because the majority of attorneys already keep fairly
detailed records of time expended. It is unlikely, however, that
the records are sufficiently categorized beyond time expended for
a particular client on a particular matter to facilitate a determina-
tion, for example, of the proportion of a three hour meeting
actually spent discussing the income issue or the title issue. If
feasible, however, such a method provides a concrete basis for allo-
cation. Furthermore, the attorney should be expert in determining
the division of his fees among the several elements. The procedure
does have the drawback, however, of placing the attorney in a posi-
tion of potential ethical conflict. As a practical matter the client
will desire a maximum deduction and the attorney will desire to
further his client's interests consistent with the Professional Code
of Ethics and the law.
The second method allocates expenses on the assumption that
fees were incurred in proportion to the separate classes of recovery.
Under this system, in a mixed capital-ordinary situation, the entire
expense would be multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which
is the amount recovered in a particular class and the denominator
of which is the total amount recovered. For example in the hypo-
thetical, B's deductible expenses would equal $4,000 (total legal
1 8 The Internal Revenue Service specifically approved this method to separate
expenses for advice regarding the tax consequences incident to divorce from the
expenses of divorce advice itself in Revenue Ruling 72-545, 1972-2 C.B. 179. The
ruling contains two examples of the "reasonable basis" required for allocation and
deduction of expenses of tax advice: (1) A law finn handled certain nontax divorce-
related matters in addition to tax matters incident to the divorce. The tax problems
are handled exclusively by the firm's tax department. The statement for the firm's
services breaks down the fee between time of the tax department and other time.
(2) A firm represents the taxpayer in connection with all matters pertaining to a
divorce. Although apparently not segregated by department, the firm allocates the
fee between the tax and nontax matters "based primarily on the amount of attorney's
time attributable to each, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
services, and the results obtained in the divorce negotiations." Id.
The ruling contains a third example that involves no true allocation: A law
firm limiting its practice to matters involving state and federal taxation advises the
taxpayer of the federal tax consequences of a proposed property settlement. Al
the expenses are deductible. Id.
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fees) times $75,000 (royalties recovered) divided by $300,000 (total
amount recovered) or $1,000. The remainder or $3,000 would be
an addition to the patent's basis. In Helvering v. Stormfeltz,159
the court stated: "Such allocation attributes to each of the separate
classes of recovery its proportionate part of the total expense and
would seem to be a rational method of distribution of expense." 160
Courts have adopted this method in situations involving re-
covery of stock and dividend income, 1" enforceability of stock
repurchase agreement and settlement of negligence claim, 62 re-
covery of taxable and nontaxable income,'0 3 recovery of patent and
past royalties,0 4 and recovery of rent-producing property and rent.0 5
In fact the recovery ratio seems to be the most widely adopted
method for allocating expenses. The procedure can be criticized
as arbitrary and inaccurate, for generally there is no indication in
such cases that the expenditures were actually made in the resulting
proportions.0 6 Furthermore, the procedure will be useful only
where there is recovery. Finally, even if recovery is had, the judg-
ment may not itself contain a separate breakdown of the recovery
actually achieved with respect to each item. For example, B might
have obtained a judgment granting him a one-half interest in the
patent and $75,000 in accrued royalties. In order to use the re-
covery ratio procedure, B must estimate the value of his half interest
in the patent. In that situation B probably has no particular ek-
pertise in this area compared to the lawyer who is expert in judg-
ing the value of his services. B would probably require an outside
appraisal, but the cost may prove prohibitive in relation to the
deduction sought. In those situations in which the value of the
several elements of recovery are readily ascertainable, however, the
superior administrability of this method over the first outweighs
any potential arbitrariness or inaccuracy. It should be the 'pre-
159 142 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1944).
160 Id. 985.
161 Spangler v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1963); Helvering v.
Stormfeltz, 142 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1944).
162Eisler v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 634 (1973).
163 Mary Tighe, 33 T.C. 557 (1959); Edward Malinckrodt, Jr., 2 T.C. 1128
(1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denfed, 324 U.S. 871 (1945).
164 William A. Falls, 7 T.C. 66 (1946).
165 Daniel S.W. Kelly, 23 T.C. 682 (1955), aff'd, 228 F.2d 512 (7th Cir.
1956).
166 In fact the procedure is often used because of a lack of evidence as to
actual expenditures. See, e.g., Daniel S.W. Kelly, 23 T.C. 682 (1955), aff'd, 228
F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1956); Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr., 2 T.C. 1128 (1943), aff'd,
146 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871 (1945).
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ferred method and the existence of two measurable elements should
create a presumption that the resulting ratio is the correct measure.
If the necessary values are not available, however, the third
procedure would attempt to accommodate as closely as possible all
the facts and circumstances of a particular multi-faceted suit. As
one court has stated:
[W]e must look to the issues involved, the nature and ob-
jectives of the suit in which the expenditures were made,
the defenses asserted, the purpose for which the claimed
deductions were expended, the background of the litiga-
tion, and all facts pertaining to the entire controversy out
of which the disputed expenses arose.167
At this point, the same considerations encountered in the discussions
of the primary purpose and origin tests resurface. It is relevant
at this point to determine the relative weights that the taxpayer
may have accorded the elements of the suit and to determine which
of several origins may have been the most fundamental. The ob-
servations of Judge Learned Hand in Cohan v. Commissioner,65 are
apropos:
The Board refused to allow him any part of [his enter-
tainment expenses], on the ground that it was impossible
to tell how much he had in fact spent, in the absence of
any item or details. The question is how far this refusal
is justified, in view of the finding that he had spent much
and that the sums were allowable expenses. Absolute cer-
tainty in such matters is usually impossible and is not
necessary; the Board should make as close an approxima-
tion as it can, bearing heavily if it chooses upon the tax-
payer whose inexactitude is of his own making.'6 9
Utilized in myriad situations to allow deductions that would other-
wise be denied because of a failure of strict proof,17 0 the Cohan
doctrine has frequently been invoked to allocate legal fees between
two categories of deductible and nondeductible expenses.171
107Estate of Morgan v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1964).
Accord, Buder v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Mo. 1963).
16839 F2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930).
169 Id. 543-44.
170 See cases collected in 4A MERTENS, supra note 2, § 25.04.
171Brown v. United States, 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19501 (N.D. Tex. 1970);
Buddy Schoellkopf Prod., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 640 (1975); Merians v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 187 (1973); Vest v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 128 (1971),
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Usually in litigation indirectly involving title some evidence
will exist to enable the court to make a reasoned apportionment of
the expenses. In contrast to the Cohan case, the inexactitude will
not be of the taxpayer's own making, but will stem from the impos-
sibility of actual measure. In defense of title cases, therefore, the
courts should not use a presumption against the taxpayer. The
goal is a reasonable approximation of the actual expenses incurred
with respect to each element:
We recognize that a rough approximation is all that can be
expected. The records of Ditmars' attorneys may contain
material that will assist in the allocation of the counsel
fees, and opinion evidence may have to be taken as to the
relative gravity of the trustee's charges-unless, indeed, the
parties should avail themselves of a less scientific but prob-
ably more satisfactory method of disposition.
7 2
In situations in which clear and convincing proof is not avail-
able and in which the recovery ratio method cannot be used, the
basic policy of temporal matching militates in favor of a reasonable
allocation based on as many of the surrounding facts and circum-
stances as can be ascertained. Although such a method can be
criticized as engendering disputes between taxpayers and the Service,
the record under the primary purpose and origin of the claim tests
shows that the sacrifice of equity and accuracy has not achieved
certainty under the revenue laws. The alternative of allocation has
the virtue of giving truer expression to the essential matching policy
of the capital-ordinary distinction.
rev'd in part, aff'd in part on other grounds, 481 F.2d 238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1092 (1973); Thomas E. Arnett, 31 T.C. 320 (1958); James Petroleum
Corp., 24 T.C. 509 (1955), aff'd on other grounds, 238 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957); Daniel S.W. Kelly, 23 T.C. 682 (1955), aff'd,
228 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1956).
172 Ditmars v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 481, 488-89 (2d Cir. 1962).
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